Friday, January 13, 2012

B-57 Canberra

The Glenn L. Martin Company's B-57 Canberra was derived from the first British built jet bomber. This high altitude radar bomber was developed by the English Electric Company, Limited, in answer to specifications B 3/45, as issued by the British Ministry of Supply in 1945 (Britain's first jet bomber was actually conceived in 1944 by W. E. W. Teddy" Fetter, who later designed the Lightning and Gnat interceptors.). The first 2 man prototype of the English Electric Canberra was flown in May 1949 at the Wharton airdrome. In September, it was revealed to the aeronautical world at the Farnborough flying display of the Society of British Aircraft Constructors. The plane, like the several variants subsequently developed from its basic design, demonstrated superior characteristics. Not only could the new bomber take off and land in combat configuration on short and easily constructed runways, but it maneuvered well at low and high speeds. The United States, through the Martin Company, eventually bought off the shelf 2 B.Mk.2s, English Electric's first true production of the Canberra. The B.Mk.2, in contrast to the May 1949 prototype, carried a crew of 3-a pilot, navigator/plotter, and observer.

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (The Korean conflict lasted from 25 June 1950 until 27 July 1953.) the USAF Board of Senior Officers began discussing how to replace quickly the weary Douglas B-26 Invader with a modern tactical bomber, specifically geared for night operations. To this end, the preliminary requirements of September 1950 called for a light jet bomber with a service ceiling of 40,000 feet, a cruising speed of about 400 knots, a maximum speed of 550 knots, and a range of almost 1,000 nautical miles. The needed aircraft also had to be capable of operating from unimproved airfields, of searching for targets at low speed and low altitude, and of destroying mobile or stationary targets at night or in bad weather, with conventional or atomic weapons. High altitude reconnaissance was another requirement.

Few aircraft, either under development or in operation, could be adapted to satisfy the requirements of September 1950 without excessive delay. Hence, the list of U.S. and foreign candidates was short. Specific possibilities were the Douglas B-26 (an improved version of World War II vintage), the Martin XB-51, the North American B-45 and AJ-1, the Canadair CF-100, and the English Electric Canberra. Much was already known about the new Canberra, but not quite enough. It had favorably impressed the USAF staff officers who had witnessed its first flight at Wharton airdrome in 1949 (The Canberra flight of 1949 underscored Great Britain's spectacular post World War II advancements and her superiority in jet propulsion development. It gave credence to the British claim that production of thousands of Canbecras was the factor which alone could best provide the tactical sirpower necessary to counterbalance Soviet predominance in ground troops.). In the summer of 1950, a committee headed by Brig. Gen. Albert Boyd, Commander of Edwards AFB, had given the plane an "expedited" and "limited evaluation." Therefore, the committee's report of 28 September was not conclusive. It deemed the Canberra suitable for all weather fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and medium altitude bomber operations. Yet, the report said the plane had little potential as a ground attack fighter bomber because it was unstable during close support maneuvers. In the same cautious vein, the committee found that the British plane's tactical utility and ease of production warranted its "consideration" for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (W. Barton Leach, Special Consultant to Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington and to Secretary Thomas K. Finletter. Mr. Symington's successor, was among those who visited England in 1949 and 1950 for the primary purpose of reviewing the British jet propulsion accomplishments. Upon his return, Leach discussed the British Canberra proposal with John A. McCone, Under Secretary of the Air Force. While thinking that there might be disadvantages in diverting American production "heavily" to an aircraft of the Canberra type, beach recognized that such a proposal could not be dismissed lightly, because the whole basic structure of strategic planning was involved. The discussion was to prove academic, since the Martin B-57 production never even reached the 500 mark). On the other hand, the Canberra should not be used in the United States Air Force before "rigorous evaluation" of at least 1 aircraft and accelerated service testing of several prototypes. If eventually procured, the plane would require at least 25 changes. Even then, to benefit from the Canberra's design, the Air Force would have to accept the initial airframe, performance, and load capacity.

Subsequent to this appraisal, the Board of Senior Officers organized another committee. It was chaired by Brig. Gen. S. P Wright, Deputy Commander of the Air Proving Ground, and included several representatives from Air Materiel Command (AMC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC).

With the Boyd report on hand, the Wright Committee measured the Canberra's performance against that of the 4 remaining candidates, a comparison that did not help the North American B-45 and AJ-1. The B-45 was ruled out because it was too heavy; the Navy AJ-1, because it was too slow. While noting that neither the XB-51 nor the Canberra fully met the Air Force's night intruder requirements, the Wright Committee endorsed both. It proposed the immediate purchase of British Canberras for 2 light bombardment groups and future procurement of sufficient B-51s to equip 2 other groups. The Wright Committee's suggestion aroused scant enthusiasm among the Air Staff members. The Board of Senior Officers, after studying the Air Proving Ground Command's latest evaluations, found itself liking the Canberra's performance. In contrast, it seriously doubted that the B-51's range could ever match the Canberra's radius of actions (Martin's 2 XB-51s, under contract since May 1946, did not fly until October 1949. Costing a total of $12.6 million, both aircraft eventually crashed.). Although aware that the Canberra would need modification for the night intruder role, the board asked Lt. Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel, to ascertain if the British could furnish enough Canberras and still satisfy Royal Air Force orders. Nonetheless, as recommended by General Boyd, the board felt that no determination could be made until a borrowed Canberra became available. Going several steps further, the board then decided not only to await the plane's arrival, but to make on the spot comparisons with every initial aircraft candidate. This evaluation, it believed, together with a review of the night intruder's future role, should ensure the best solution to the present dilemma.

After hinging for weeks on divergent opinions, the Air Force decision to get a facsimile of the English Electric Canberra was nearly unanimous. As negotiated with the British government, a Royal Air Force Canberra B. Mk.2, bearing USAF insignia, left Northern Ireland on 20 February for Gander Field, Newfoundland. It landed in Baltimore, Maryland, on 21 February the first jet aircraft to complete an unrefueled flight across the Atlantic Ocean and arrived at Andrews AFB 2 days later. Ensuing flight demonstrations and ground inspections of the Canberra sealed the fate of other candidates. On 26 February, the Senior Officers and USAF Weapons Boards picked the British plane as the best interim aircraft available for the night tactical intruder role. General Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, (General Vandenberg succeeded Gen. Carl Spaatz as Chief of Staff of the Air Force on 30 April 1948) and Secretary Finletter swiftly agreed.

The Air Force wanted a night intruder so badly that it took just a few days to set in motion the informal production decision of 26 February. Since General Wolfe had found out that the British could barely take care of their own Canberra needs, the Air Staff directed AMC on 2 March 1951 to arrange for the aircraft's domestic production. Martin became the chosen contractor. The Air Force was convinced that the XB-51 had given that company a sound background for dealing with the potential problems of a high performance tactical bomber.

Procurement Directive 51 135, issued by the Air Staff on 2 March, reflected the urgency of bringing into service an American version of the Canberra. The B-57, as the aircraft was to be known, was to go directly into production, a decision tantamount to buying an off the shelf airframe with an off the shelf engine and installed equipment. Even though the resulting aircraft, 250 of them to begin with, might not be exactly what was needed, configuration changes would be kept to a bare minimum under the strict control of the Board of Senior Officers.

The British Canberra, exhibited at Andrews AFB, reached the Martin Company on 10 March. This permanent assignment grew out of a Combined Test Project Agreement, formalized with the Royal Air Force on 16 March. Under the same agreement, Martin received a second British Canberra several months later. Although the 2 planes acquired USAF serial numbers (51-17352 and 51-17387), they were carried in the Air Force inventory as Canberras, not as B-57s.

The informal production decision of 26 February 1951 was finalized on 24 March by Letter Contract AF 33(038)-22617. This production letter contract asked Martin to deliver 250 B-57s between November 1952 and October 1953. The schedule was predicated on Martin's attaining a peak production rate of 50 airplanes per month.

The production letter contract of 24 March covered more than the procurement of 250 B-57s. It authorized Martin to acquire the Canberra manufacturing rights, and gave the company a $6 million advance payment to take care of its most pressing expenditures. The license agreement finally worked out by the British and American firms was signed on 8 May 1951. Martin eventually built 403 B-57s of one kind or another; the English Electric Company, Ltd., in time received royalties topping $3.5 million. Another $1 million was paid for the 2 Canberras secured by Martin during the spring and summer of 1951. The Air Force reimbursed Martin the full cost of the 2 imported planes.

Dassault Rafale,one in top 10 Best Fighter

The Rafale features a delta wing combined with an active forward canard to maximize maneuverability (withstanding 9G or -3G) while maintaining stability in flight; the forward canard also reduces landing speed to 115 knots. The aircraft can operate from 400 meter runways.

The Rafale carries, for the first time in aviation history, an integrated electronic survival system named SPECTRA which features a software-based virtual stealth technology. The most important sensor is the Thales RBE2 passive electronically scanned multi-mode radar. Thales claims to have achieved unprecedented levels of situational awareness through the earlier detection and tracking of multiple air targets for close combat and long-range interception, as well as real time generation of three-dimensional maps for terrain-following and the real time generation of high resolution ground maps for navigation and targeting.

However, in those circumstances when signature management is required, the Rafale can use several passive sensor systems.

The front-sector electro-optical system or Optroniques Secteur Frontal (OSF), developed by Thales, is completely integrated within the aircraft and can operate both in the visible and infrared wavelengths.

The SPECTRA electronic warfare system, jointly developed by Thales and EADS France, provides the aircraft with the highest survivability assets against airborne and ground threats.[10] The real-time data link allows communication not only with other aircraft, but also with fixed and mobile command and control centres. For those missions requiring it, the Rafale will also eventually use the DAMOCLES electro-optical/laser designation pod that brings full day and night LGB capability, though the Arm%uFFFDe de l'Air's current plans call for Rafale to use stand off weapons, and for the LGB role to be handled by Mirage 2000s.

The Rafale core systems employ an Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA), called MDPU (Modular Data Processing Unit). This architecture hosts all the core functions of the aircraft as Flight management system, Data Fusion, Fire Control, Man-Machine Interface, etc...

The cockpit uses a Martin-Baker Mark 16F "zero-zero" ejection seat, i.e. capable of being used at zero speed and zero altitude. The seat is inclined 29 degrees backwards to improve G force tolerance. The canopy hinges open to the right. An on-board oxygen generating system is provided to eliminate the need for multiple oxygen canisters.

The cockpit includes a wide-angle holographic Head Up Display (HUD) and two head-down flat-panel colour multifunction displays ( MFDs). Display interaction is by means of touch input for which the pilot wears silk-lined leather gloves. In addition, in full development, the pilot will have a Helmet-Mounted Display ( HMD).

The pilot flies the aircraft with a side-stick controller mounted on his right and a throttle on his left. These incorporate multiple `hands on throttle and stick%u2019 (HOTAS) controls. The Rafale cockpit is also planned to include Direct Voice Input (DVI), allowing for pilot action by voice commands.

Although not a true stealth aircraft, the Rafale has reduced radar signature measures like many of its contemporaries such as the Super Hornet and Typhoon. According to Dassault, while most of the stealth design features are classified, extensive use of composite materials and serrated patterns on the trailing edges of the wings and canards help to reduce the radar cross section.

Initial deliveries of the Rafale M were to the F1 ("France 1") standard. This meant that the aircraft was suitable for air-to-air combat, replacing the obsolescent F-8 Crusader as the Aviation Navale's carrier-based fighter, but not equipped or armed for air-to-ground operations. Actual deliveries (to Flotille 11 some time after 2007) are to the "F2" standard, giving air-to-ground capability, and replacing the Dassault-Breguet Super Etendard in the ground attack role and the Dassault Etendard IVP in the reconnaissance role. This will leave the Rafale M as the only fixed-wing combat aircraft flown by the Aviation Navale, and plans are to upgrade all airframes to the "F3" standard, with terrain-following 3D radar and nuclear capability, from early in the decade following 2010.

The first Rafale C delivered to the Armee de l'Air, in June 2005, was to the "F2" standard, and it is anticipated that upgrades similar to those of the navy will take place in the future. The Rafale replaces the SEPECAT Jaguar, Mirage F1 and the Mirage 2000 in the Armee de l'Air.


Dassault Rafale Background
 
In the mid 1970s, both the French Air Force (Armee de l'Air) and Navy (Aeronavale) had a requirement (the Navy's being rather more pressing) to find a new generation of fighter (principally to replace AdlA SEPECAT Jaguars and Aeronavale F-8 Crusaders), and their requirements were similar enough to be merged into one project.

The Rafale A technology demonstrator was rolled out in late 1985 and made its maiden flight on 4 July 1986. The SNECMA M88 engines being developed were not considered sufficiently mature for the initial trials programme to be conducted without risk (though their development status has often been underplayed), so the demonstrator flew with General Electric F404-GE-400 afterburning turbofans as used on the F/A-18 Hornet. Production orders were placed in 1988.

Further testing continued, including carrier touch-and-go landings and test-flying early M88 engines, before the Rafale A was retired in 1994. Though the Rafale A and British Aerospace EAP were broadly comparable, when the first Eurofighter made its maiden flight in March 1994, pre-series Rafales had been flight-testing for three years, including carrier trials (Rafale C01, Rafale M01, and Rafale B01 first flew in May 1991, December 1991, and April 1993 respectively). Three versions of Rafale were in the initial production order:


* Rafale C (Chasseur) Single-seat fighter for the AdA (Armee de l'Air, French Air Force)

* Rafale B (Biplace) Two-seat fighter for the AdA

* Rafale M (Marine) Single-seat carrier fighter for the Aeronavale

The prototype Rafale C flew in 1991, the first of two Rafale M prototypes flew later that year. The prototype Rafale B flew in early 1993, and the second Rafale M prototype flew later that year. Catapult trials were initially carried out between July 13 and August 23, 1992 at NAS Lakehurst in New Jersey, USA and NAS Patuxent River, Maryland, USA, as France had no land-based catapult test facility. The aircraft then undertook trials aboard the carrier Foch.

Initially the Rafale B was to be just a trainer, but Gulf War and Kosovo experience showed that a second crewmember is invaluable on strike and reconnaissance missions, and therefore more Rafale Bs were ordered, replacing some Rafale Cs. 60% of the aircraft will be two seaters. A similar decision was made by the Navy, who initially did not have a two-seat aircraft on order; the program nevertheless was stopped.

Political and economic uncertainty meant that it was not until 1999 that a production Rafale M flew.

At one time the French forces were expected to order 294 Rafales: 232 for the Air Force and 60 for the Navy. But as time passed, these number dropped and to date 120 Rafales have been officially ordered. These are being delivered in three separate batches, the most recent being the December 2004 order for 59 Rafales, though the French Ministry of Defence has revealed that this figure is currently under study and is likely to be reduced to 51 aircraft "for the same overall cost". It was hinted that the sacrifice of 8 aircraft would "allow for the introduction of new sensors developed by the French industry on this batch."

The marine version has priority since the aircraft it is replacing are much older Vought F-8 fighters. Service deliveries began in 2001 and the type "entered service" on 4 December 2000, though the first squadron, Flotille 12, did not actually reform until 18 May 2001. The unit embarked on the Charles de Gaulle in 2002, becoming fully operational on 25 June 2004, following an extended opeval (operational evaluation) which included flying limited escort and tanker missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom over Afghanistan.

The Armee de l'Air received its first three Rafale Bs (to F2 standards) in late December 2004. They went to the Centre d'militaires (CEAM) at Mont-de-Marsan for operational evaluation and associated pilot conversion training.The first Armee de l'Air frontline unit, Escadron de Chasse 1/7 Provence, will form at Saint-Dizier during 2006, delayed deliveries having forced some delay to the squadron's stand up date. Full Operational Capability (FOC) was until recently still optimistically scheduled for September 2006, but has now slipped back to mid-2007, when the type should be fully operational as an omni-role fighter/fighter-bomber with MICA air-to-air missiles, SCALP EG cruise missiles, GPS-guided bombs, and laser-guided bombs (LGBs) (though the latter will be designated by other platforms or by ground based systems).